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By The Classical Association of the Atlantic States

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USEFUL PAMPHLETS

Attention might well have been called before to two Bulletins of the First District Normal School, Kirksville, Missouri. The first of these, officially known as Volume XV, No. 4, Ancient Language Series, Number 1, published April, 1915, is a pamphlet of thirty-two pages, whose contents are as follows:

The Qualifications of a High School Latin Teacher, J. B. Game (3-5); Latin as a Vocational Study, B. P. Gentry (5-7); A Symposium on the Value of a Knowledge of Latin (7-13), with subdivisions as follows: The Pedagogy Teacher's Point of View, W. A. Clark, The English Teacher's Point of View, A. L. Phillips, The History Teacher's Point of View, E. M. Violette, The Mathematics Teacher's Point of View, W. H. Zeigel, The Science Teacher's Point of View, J. S. Stokes; Excerpts From What Lawyers Have Said Concerning the Value to the Lawyer of Training in the Classics, compiled by B. P. Gentry (13-16); Excerpts From What Physicians Have Said about the Value to the Student of Medicine of Training in the Ancient Classics, compiled by B. P. Gentry (16-18); The Imagination in Education, also by B. P. Gentry (18-19); Caesar and the Great War, by T. Jennie Green (20-26); Illustrative Material, T. Jennie Green (27-30); Latin in the Grades, T. Jennie Green (31-32).

The other pamphlet, known officially as Volume XVI, Number 11, Latin Series, No. 2, published in November, 1916, contains the following:

Latin Below the Ninth Grade, T. Jennie Green (3-7); Books and Illustrative Material for High School Latin, apparently by T. Jennie Green (8-12).

To the statements made in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.145-146, 191, concerning travelling collections of lantern-slides may be added the fact that the Latin Department of the Kirksville Normal School has nine sets of slides which it lends to Schools (presumably to Schools in Missouri) without charge, except for transportation. Information concerning these slides can be obtained from Professor T. Jennie Green.

In THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.105 attention was called to a pamphlet entitled The Classics in Mississippi To-day, published in 1916, by The Classical Association of Mississippi. A pamphlet entitled The Classics in Mississippi Today, 1917, has also been published by the Association. The contents of this are as follows:

The Place and Importance of Greek, A. W. Mildren (3-5); Latin and the Sciences, F. J. Chastain (5-6); Reading Current Literature Through Classical Spectacles, F. Puckett (6-8); The Present Status of Latin Studies: Current Opinion and Statistics, A. L. Bondurant (8-19); Practical Value of Latin, M.

Roudebush, Dean of Women and Head of Economics Department, University, Mississippi (19-20).

Copies of the pamphlet may be obtained from Professor Alexander L. Bondurant, University, Mississippi.

To the efforts of Miss Frances E. Sabin to give practical help to teachers of Latin, especially in Wisconsin, attention has been called several times in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY (see e. g. 8.41-42; 9. 105-106). Readers of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY may be interested in the pamphlet, prepared recently by Miss Sabin, entitled The Latin Laboratory of the Wisconsin High School of the University of Wisconsin. The pamphlet sets forth the aims of the Laboratory, and the activities of the Laboratory (3-5). On pages 5-10 there is a statement of the equipment of the Laboratory, actual and prospective. C. K.

THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE OF DETERMINED FUTURITY

(Concluded from page 164)

An expression of determined futurity with an indefinite subject becomes an expression of a general truth. The temporal element becomes obscured. But there is no real shift in the modal meaning. The expression may be described as one of achronistic determination.

In Latin the subjunctive of determined futurity in the second person indefinite is quite commonly used achronistically in the statement of a general truth².

Trin. 670 Quom inopiast, cupias; quando eius copias, tum non velis.

Amph. 705 Non tu scis? Bacchae bacchanti si velis advorsarier, ex insana insaniorem facies, feriet saepius; si obsequare, una resoluas plaga.

Trin. 1052 Siquoi mutuom quid dederis, fit pro proprio perditum; quom repetas, inimicum amicum beneficio invenias tuo.

Latin also used the present indicative in these statements of a general truth. With any person except the

²Compare Sonnenschein, Unity, 5 ff. For a list of examples see Hale, Classical Philology 1. 29 ff. Granting the presence in Latin of the subjunctive of determined futurity and the use of that subjunctive in these statements of a general truth, we have at hand an easy explanation of the use of the second person indefinite in subordinate clauses. Subordinate clauses with the second person indefinite are generalizing conditions; and the subjunctive is the same as that appearing in the statement of a general truth. Examples of paratactic generalizing conditions are to be seen in *asseverat* habes of Petr. 77, quoted below, and in Horace, Carm. 4.4.65 *meres profundo, pulchrior evenit*. But it is not necessary to suppose that the Latin generalizing condition was developed directly from an original parataxis.

second person indefinite the present indicative was always used, as in Capt. 234 *Nam fere maxima pars morem hunc homines habent: quod sibi volunt, dum id impetrant, boni sunt*. But the modal meaning of such a present indicative is the same as that possessed by the second person indefinite subjunctives in the examples just quoted. What is asserted is, not that men are good, but that by a law of human nature they are bound to be good. Even with the second person indefinite the present indicative could be used. Compare Publilius Syrus 52 *Bis peccas, cum peccanti obsequium adcommodas*.

The future indicative with an indefinite subject was also used achronistically to express a general truth. As in the case of the present indicative, the verb might be in the third person or in the second person indefinite. An example with the third person is Most. 289 *Pulchra mulier nuda erit quam purpurata pulchrior*. In the following we have examples of second person indefinite subjunctive and future indicative side by side: Petronius 77 *Assem habeas, assem valeas; habes, habeberis*. Compare also the sententia in Horace, *Serm.* 1.1.61, with Augustine, *De Disc. Christ.* 11.12¹⁰, where the future indicative is used.

(2b) *The action contemplated is one which, it is seen, involves successful or unsuccessful effort on the part of some agent*. There is an implication that someone is bound to succeed or not to succeed in doing something, an implication of capacity or of opportunity. Such an implication is not due to the modal meaning, but rather to the verbal meaning sometimes assisted by a negative or such an adverb as *vix* or *facile*¹¹. As illustrations from Homeric Greek may be cited Od. 16.438, with the subjunctive, and Od. 15.321, with the optative. Latin examples are Ad. 830 *Quo vis illos die redducas* (the implication that prompts a translation 'can' or 'may' is due to *quo vis . . . die*); Bacch. 27 *Videas mercedis quid tibi aequom dari*; And. 205 *Ne temere facias: neque tu hoc dicas tibi non praedictum: cave*. 'You shall not (be able to) say'; Hec. 288 *At sic citius qui te expedit his aerumnis reperias*. Another example is *pellas* in Eun. 1080. In this case the capacity or opportunity implication is helped by the adverb *facile*: 'easily shall' implies 'easily can' or 'easily may'.

The following examples with the third person may be quoted¹²: Amph. 985 *Nec quisquam tam audax fuit homo qui obviam obsistat mihi*; Truc. 907 *Numquam hoc uno die efficiatur opus, quin opus semper siet*; Amph. 1060 *Nec me miserior feminast neque ulla videatur magis, 'nor is one to be seen more wretched', 'nor can you see one more wretched'.*

¹⁰With the exception of these two, the examples of second person indefinite future indicative quoted by Professor Hale, *Classical Philology* 1.41 f., have the capacity implication. See below, page 171.

¹¹The implication of capacity is quite common in the case of an imperfect indicative accompanied by a negative, as in Cicero, *De Sen.* 79 *Nec enim dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis*.

¹²Blase, *Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache*, III. 1.123, quotes Truc. 907 and Amph. 1060 as examples of subjunctives used in a future sense. Compare also Rodenbusch, *De Temporum Usu Plautino*, 57 ff., and Kroll, *Glotta* 7.127.

The subjunctive in the first example is not volitive. The precise interpretation is not easy; but I am inclined to think that the meaning is, 'No man shall (be able to) get up enough courage to stand in my way'. The implication of capacity is clear in the other two examples. In Amph. 1060 the second person indefinite active might have been used.

The use of verbs of perceiving, knowing, and finding in the second person indefinite subjunctive is common in Latin. The implication of capacity or opportunity is clear in the case of such verbs. As in the other cases of the second person indefinite discussed above, the temporal meaning disappears. The statement becomes one of a general truth. Compare the general statements in Od. 4.78, 'no mortal man shall (can) vie with Zeus', and Il. 8.143, 'by no means shall (can) a man hinder the will of Zeus'. Latin examples are And. 460 *Fidelem haud ferme mulieri invenias virum*¹³; Trin. 554 *Quamvis malam rem quaeras, illic reperias*; Pseud. 1176 *Ubi suram aspicias, scias posse eum gerere crassas compedes*; Cas. 562 *At quom aspicias tristem, frugi censeas*; Curc. 292 *quos semper videas bibentes esse in thermipolio*; Publilius Syrus 167 *Fortunam citius reperias quam retineas*; Horace, *Serm.* 1.4.86 *Saepe tribus lectis videas cenare quaternos*. Other examples are Aul. 505, Hec. 58, Most. 278, Capt. 420, Mil. 689, Most. 243, Poen. 836, etc.

With verbs other than those mentioned the implication may appear, but not so clearly: Publilius Syrus 278 *Iniuriam facilius facias quam feras*; 645 *Virtute quod non possis, blanditia auferas*; 21 *Avarum facile capias, ubi non sis item*; Sallust, *Cat.* 52.4 *Nam cetera maleficia tum persequare, ubi facta sunt*.

In these statements of a general truth, the idea of capacity was often too prominent to be left to implication; hence *possis* was often used with a dependent infinitive. This was true even when the infinitive was a verb of perceiving, knowing, or finding. The examples, of course, logically belong under 2a. Compare Cato, *Agr.* 17.1 *Id semen legere possis*; Lucretius 1.327 *quid quoque amittant in tempore cernere possis*. Other examples are Lucretius 3.856 (*accrere*), 4.1231 (*cernere*), 6.113 (*cognoscere*), Cicero, *Sex. Rosc.* 75 (*reperire*), Horace, *Serm.* 1.2.94 (*cernere*), 1.2.19

¹³The Plautine and Terentian examples with *reperias* are quoted by Bennett (*Syntax of Early Latin* 1.200) as examples of the 'attenuated should-would potential'. The list given contains some examples of an altogether different character. Some have the third person in an interrogative sentence. These cannot be discussed here; but the subjunctive is not equivalent to an indicative. In Haut. 606 the manuscripts have *possit* or *posset*, and there is no good reason for the emendation to *possit*. Haut. 620 has the third person in an echo question. In Most. 148 *quid* depends on *quin*. With the exception of Hec. 288, Eun. 1080, and Ad. 829, which Bennett says have a subjunctive equivalent in meaning to a future indicative, the other examples have the second person indefinite. Why these should be separated from the examples of the 'can-could' potential (page 206) it is impossible to see. For example, the *videas* of Mil. 94 has as much of the capacity idea as does the *videas* of Capt. 420; and the same is true of the *videas* of Aul. 505. Moreover, the capacity-implication is rather stronger in most cases of *reperias* than it is in *videas*. As for *velim*, *malim*, *nolim*, I see no reason for supposing that the modal meaning was 'attenuated'. The fact that the Roman often said *velim* where he might have said *solo* and where an English speaking person would say 'I wish' proves nothing.

(*credere*). As an example of *possis* with a verb not belonging to one of the classes mentioned above may be quoted Lucretius 2.220 tantum quod mōmen mutatum dicere possis. Interesting is the example from Publilius Syrus 645, quoted above, in which the idea of capacity is expressed directly in the relative clause and left to implication in the principal clause.

The future indicative in the second person indefinite could be used achronistically to express a general truth. See above, page 170. With such verbs as *invenies*, *reperies*, *videbis*, *scies*, and occasionally others, there will be an implication of capacity, as in the case of the subjunctives just discussed. Compare Mil. 659 At quidem illuc aetatis qui sit non invenies alterum; Men. 93 Facile adservabis, dum eo vinco vincies; Publilius Syrus 664 Facile invenies qui bene faciant cum qui fecerunt coles. Other examples are Vergil, Geor. 1.365 (*videbis*), Publilius Syrus 673 (*reperies*), and the following with *invenies*: Publilius Syrus 393, 676, 721, Catullus 89.6, Petronius 56, Tacitus, Dial. 8. With *videatur* of Amph. 1060 should be compared the third person passive in Afranius 7 Haut facul, ut ait Pacuvius, femina invenietur bona. In Juvenal 14.42-43 the subjunctive *videas* is paralleled by the future *erit*. In Cicero, De Am. 63 we have *ubi eos inveniemus?* which should be compared with *ubi enim istum invenias?* of the next paragraph.

(3) *The action or situation contemplated is one under the control of an agent; the determinant is logical or ethical.* As illustrations from Greek may be cited Od. 22.350 ('is bound to choose to say') and 20.135 ('you are not to blame one'). It is in case of verbs and verbal phrases denoting mental action, mental attitude, or the expression of thought that the implication of the logical or ethical determinant will most easily arise. Since, for example, the act of believing is not subject to the will of another, a statement that 'you are bound to believe' naturally implies that considerations of logic condition the belief and hence that 'you ought (logically) to believe'. It is true that, under circumstances giving rise to such an expression of determined futurity, a volitive expression might be used. On the one hand, an expression of determined futurity, in case the action is under the control of the person concerned, serves to give directions. The Greek examples referred to above are sometimes translated into English by the imperative; and the *credas* of And. 787 is mistaken for a volitive subjunctive 'with *non* for *ne*'. On the other hand, a direct command to do that which the person commanded may do or leave undone may carry an implication that he ought to do it, logically or ethically¹¹. In Latin, for positive sentences we unfortunately lack such marks of distinction as the Greek *ἀν* and *αἰ*; but in negative sentences the determined futurity meaning

may be indicated by the choice of the negative, as in the following examples with the second person definite: And. 787 Hic est ille: non te credas Davom ludere¹²; Trin. 606 Non credibile dices. At tu edepol nullus creduas. The use of *neque* may not be as conclusive evidence of a non-volitive modal meaning as is the use of *non*; but I have no hesitation in classing the subjunctives of the two following examples as subjunctives of determined futurity to be translated by 'you are to'¹³: Eun. 77 neque praeter quam quas ipse amor molestias habet addas, et illas quas habet recte feras; Eun. 1080 neque istum metuas ne amet mulier. In the absence of evidence to the contrary the following example should be considered as having the same modal meaning: Ad. 830 At enim metuas ne ab re sint tamen omissiores paulo.

It is probable that a good many first person plural subjunctives unaccompanied by a negative have the determined futurity meaning with a logical or ethical determinant. For example, in Eun. 609 Perlongest, sed tanto ocius properemus, the meaning may be 'let us hasten', but more probably it is 'we are to hasten'. Still more certain are the two Ciceronian passages quoted above, page 163, Ad Att. 2.5.1, and Ad Att. 9.6.2. With the negative *non*, however, the determined futurity meaning is clearly indicated: Scipio, in Gellius 4.18.3 Non igitur simus ingrati; Cicero, Pro Cluent. 155 A legibus non recedamus. Other examples are Seneca, Epp. 99.14, and Quintilian 7.1.56.

In the last example quoted, the subject is indefinite and the directions given are general. It was, of course, possible to give general directions by the use of the volitive subjunctive, as in Cato, Agr. 5.2 Vilicus ne sit ambulator¹⁴, but the subjunctive of determined futurity was especially well fitted for this purpose. Examples of the second person indefinite so used are to be quoted below. The modal meaning of determined futurity is to be seen in the following examples with the third person: Cato, Agr. 5.3 Iniussu domini credat nemini; Ennius, Ann. 509 Nemo me lacrimis decoret neque funera fletu faxit; Horace, Epp. 1.18.72 Non ancilla tuum iecur ulceret ulla puerve; Quintilian 1.1.5 Non adulescat ergo ne dum infans quidem est sermoni qui

¹²Fleckeisen, following Priscian, unnecessarily emended to *ne credas*.

¹³I omit discussion of the subjunctives accompanied by *neque* in the contract, Asin. 751-807. But I now believe that I was mistaken in assuming (American Journal of Philology 16.495 f.) that these subjunctives are volitive.

¹⁴The examples with the imperfect and the past perfect subjunctive and negative *ne* sometimes quoted in discussion of the so-called subjunctive of 'obligation or propriety' do not belong here. Men. 611, At tu ne clam me comesses prandium, has its *ne* from a correction of a second hand of B; but the *neq* *iam* of the first hand may have been a mistake for *neq* *clam*. On the other hand, Bothe and Ritschl emended *comesses* to *comessis*, and this gives better sense. *Ne faceres* of Pseud. 437 depends on *nevis* of the preceding line. The colon should be placed after *nequiquam*. Simo has just said, 'I don't want him to act that way'; and Callipho responds, 'But that doesn't count. You're not wishing that you did not act so in your youth'. The use of the pluperfect subjunctive, as in Cicero, Pro Sestio 45, *ne poposcisses*, Ad Att. 2.1.3, and *ne emisisses*, Verr. 2.3.108, furnishes a problem in the development of the pluperfect subjunctive which apparently has no connection with the use of the present subjunctive now under discussion. The imperfect subjunctive could express what *was to be done* (logically or ethically) from a past point of view. The *non* of Trin. 133 *non redderes* is perfectly regular.

¹¹Compare "Go to the ant, thou sluggard". An expression of wish under similar circumstances may imply 'obligation'. Compare Od. 18.79. See Frank, Classical Philology 3.7. With Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.41 Quam quisque norit artem in hac se exerceat, compare the proverb as it appears in Aristophanes, Vesp. 143, where the optative is used.

dediscendus sit. Compare further Cicero, *De Re Pub.* 4.6.6 and *Pro Plancio* 15, both with *nec*.

Examples without a negative are the follownig: *Amph.* 959-961 *Atque ita servom par videtur frugi sese instituere: proinde eri ut sint, ipse item sit: voltum e voltu comparet: tristis sit, si eri sint tristes: hilarus sit, si gaudeant.* In *Bacch.* 652-662, we have a number of examples of a similar character. Compare also *Truc.* 855 *blitea et luteast meretrix nisi quae sapit in vino ad rem suam: si alia membra vino madeant, cor sit saltem sobrium.* In *Truc.* 230-233 we have directions concerning the proper treatment by a meretrix of an improverished love. Add *Persa* 125 *Cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe: ampullam, strigilem, scaphium, soccos, pallium, marsupium habeat; Cicero, Pro Murena* 30 *Quod si ita est, cedat opinor forum castris.* . . . Here belongs also *Phor.* 243, in case the correct reading is *cogitet*.

With the second person indefinite, the truth stated is more general than in the case of the examples with the third person just quoted. The sentences express achronistically what is to be done logically or ethically. The action expressed by the verb is one clearly under the control of the agent. The verbs are verbs of mental action or mental attitude: *Merc.* 553 *Demum igitur, quom seis iam senex, tum in otium te conloces, dum potes ames; Phor.* 243 *Peregre rediens semper cogites*¹⁸; *Truc.* 163 *Dum vivit, hominem noveris: ubi mortuost, quiescat.* Cato furnishes a number of examples, as in *Agr.* 36.

Examples with a negative apparently do not occur in early Latin; but the following sententiae of Publilius Syrus have the negative *non*, and the subjunctives, therefore, are clearly not volitive: 126 *De inimico non loquaris male sed cogites; 175 Feras, non culpes quod mutari non potest.* With this compare 432 *Necessita tem ferre non flere addeceat.* The negative in the last two examples should lead us to take the following sententiae of Publilius Syrus as examples of the subjunctive of determined futurity: 187 *Feras difficilia ut facilia perferas; 421 Nihil turpe ducas pro salutis remedio; 470 Per quae sis tutus, illa semper cogites; 507 Quicquid coneris quo pervenias cogites.* Compare further 107, 136, 189, 244, 248, 343, 472. The modal meaning of the second person indefinite subjunctive in the following example is indicated by the *χρῆναι* of the Greek original (*Euripides, Phoen.* 524) of which it is a translation. Compare the *χρῆναι* of the conditional clause, which expresses determined futurity, but with a determinant of natural necessity: Cicero, *De Off.* 3.82 *Nam si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia violandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas.*

SALT LAKE CITY.

FRANK H. FOWLER.

REVIEWS

The Ethics of Euripides. By Rhys Carpenter. New York: Columbia University Press (1916). Pp. 48.

The main thesis of this most interesting and useful essay, reprinted from the *Archives of Philosophy*, for

May, 1916, is that there is in all moral judgments expressed by Euripides an underlying ethical principle, which Euripides held in common with the Greeks of his time generally, artists and poets, philosophers and moralists alike, namely, that whatever is in accordance with Nature is best, for man as well as for animals and plants. This implies, as Dr. Carpenter says (page 1), that "the Greek standard, the ethical and physical sanction, is not drawn from a supra-mundane or transcendental source, but from the physical world as it is or as it tends to be". Such a belief is opposed to the fundamental conception of Christian moralists, that the soul, the only important part of man, belongs wholly to a spiritual world, which is antagonistic to the physical, and that therefore man should seek to subdue Nature to himself and overcome the 'Flesh'.

The author begins with a quotation from Pindar's Ninth Olympian, 'Nature's way is ever the strongest and best'. It is of small importance in this connection that this English version of the passage does not accurately represent what the poet himself meant in this particular instance. In this ode, written by Pindar in his old age, success achieved by a man because of capacities belonging to the nature bestowed upon him by the will of the gods is contrasted with what may be accomplished by powers acquired by training, powers which are "ungodded", as Professor Gildersleeve puts it. Nor is it of much consequence that Dr. Carpenter sometimes violates the rule 'nothing too much', and goes too far, as we all are prone to do, in tracing a fundamental principle where no principle is involved, or where, at least, no principle is present to the consciousness of the author under discussion. Pindar's words, stripped of their context, express tersely and strikingly a prevalent belief of the ancient Greeks. And this belief, as Dr. Carpenter shows by many citations, permeates the ethical teaching of Euripides and gives the unity of a system to utterances which at first seem inconsistent. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is, in Dr. Carpenter's opinion, but an elaboration and formal development of the same idea.

The fundamental principles of Greek ethics, exemplified in Euripides's dramas, are outlined in this essay as follows. 'Nature' is the world in which we live. Every species has its particular nature. That form of any *infima species* which is the perfect realization of its nature Plato called the 'idea' of that species, and Plato went so far as to attribute to these 'ideas' an objective existence apart from any or all the individuals of that species. A perfect rose would be one which completely conformed to its 'idea', one in which nature, unrestricted, attained complete realization. Man is like the rose, only, with him, development is not mere physical growth. "As a good rose is a perfect rose", Dr. Carpenter says, "so a good man is a perfect man", one in whom the 'nature' of man attains a perfect realization. In so far as he acts in accordance with his nature properly understood he acts rightly, in so far as he acts contrary to his nature he acts wrongly. Ideal Nature is the proper norm for man, as for every other

¹⁸The reading of Placcisen, following the manuscripts except A.

creature. "Dancing, laughter, freedom from care, wine-feasting", therefore, "are natural and salutary". Only, such things must not interfere with the other natural impulses, with the development of other capacities, or else man will not attain the fullest development of his nature, realize the ideal type of man. Plants seek sunlight and moisture: too much sun and too much moisture alike destroy them. So for man, too much love and too little, too much pleasure and too much self-denial, too much boldness and too much caution, too much energy and too much indifference alike, are harmful. In all these respects, man must be self-controlled, not because love or pleasure, boldness or energy, is wrong, but because excess is wrong. Summarizing Euripides's *Bacchae*, Dr. Carpenter (19) quotes *Bacchae* 329, 'Give Dionysus his due and you will be *σώφρων*'. The quality of being *sōphron*, as he says (18),

is not abstinence, but proper acquiescence in Nature's ways. . . . All that fine intoxication of the spirit, with which poet and votary are so familiar, is not outside of Nature's intent. . . . Let us be poets and Bacchantes, since we have it in us! Enjoyed in right amount, Dionysus is *κατὰ φύσιν* and a moral necessity, very different from excess or licentiousness.

Dr. Carpenter states (47) his opinion that a fundamental difference between Greek and Christian ethics derives from the source of moral sanction. For the Greeks, as has been said, moral sanction inhered in Nature's norm. The sanction of Christian morality is derived from that spiritual world which is conceived of as antagonistic to the natural world. This doctrine is to be found in the teachings of Christ's disciples, if not in the words of Christ himself. Consistently developed it led to asceticism among the Christians, just as the Greek doctrine led certain extremists to a conscientious hedonism. But the Christian doctrine was tempered by the belief in the obligation of brotherly love and service: the theory of the Greeks was limited by their doctrine of excess. And even with respect to the ultimate sanction or standard of morality, the difference between the Greek and the Christian view is not as great as it appears. For the Greeks also recognized that there is a spiritual side in man; but they included this spiritual side in their conception of man's nature as a whole. They differed from the Christian moralists, then, chiefly in that they did not hold man's spiritual nature to be antagonistic to his physical nature. But it cannot be maintained, I think, that even the Christian moralists consistently affirmed this antagonism, for only extremists have asserted that all pertaining to the 'Flesh' is essentially evil.

Dr. Carpenter also (11) considers it a defect of Greek ethics that its

fundamental principle must be elaborated in every part of life, in all the emotions and intellectual conditions, in every portion of the system of human conduct.

Undoubtedly this is a difficulty, to decide just where the mean between excess on either side coincides with Nature's norm. But the Christian system is not free

from this defect. It would be easy to say, on the one hand, 'Whatever impulse presents itself, if it is a *natural* impulse, follow it', or, on the other hand, 'If it is a *natural* and not a *spiritual* impulse, resist it'. But no one said either of these things, excepting some extremists.

Lastly, Dr. Carpenter points out that Greek ethics were essentially individualistic and self-centered. But this is true also of that ethical system logically evolved from the Christian principle stated above. Those conscientious Christians who consistently warred against the 'World' and the 'Flesh', withdrawing themselves from life that they might save their souls for eternity, even if they did not immure themselves in convent cells or hermit caves, were as completely self-centered as any Greek. In practice, however, few Greeks or Christians were so wholly self-centered. Even Greek ethics found a place for the duty of self-sacrifice for country or for friends or for an ideal, though such sacrifice of self must, in fairness, be regarded as strictly contrary to man's *natural* instincts or impulses. Euripides's dramas are full of such devotion, as Dr. Carpenter shows, even if the more logical Aristotle omits self-sacrifice from his ethical system.

The chief differences between the ethics of Euripides and the Christian morality are rather these. First, unselfishness was in the one case consistent, in the other inconsistent, with the fundamental principles of the system as it was logically developed. Secondly, the Christians derived knowledge of their ultimate standards chiefly from divine revelation and from conscience, while the Greeks, although they also recognized to some extent divine revelation, depended for the knowledge of ethical standards upon man's own understanding of his ideal nature.

The main thesis of this article, however, is admirably sustained: the belief that man's ideal nature is the proper norm of human conduct pervades and informs the ethics of Euripides.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY. WILLIAM K. PRENTICE.

Graphic Latin. By John C. Green, Jr. Published by the author, Blairstown, N. J. (1916). Four pages: unfolded, 14 by 18 inches; folded, 7 by 9 inches, in card board covers. 40 cents.

The object of this publication, as stated in the prospectus, is chiefly a matter of printing in convenient shape on large pages the material which must be before the mind for consideration at one time in solving a question of form or syntax. For this purpose it is a valuable aid. In the conventional Grammar the necessary material is well-nigh inaccessible—a fact so obvious that many teachers gave up Grammars years ago. When a pupil is endeavoring to locate an elusive fact among various hazy possibilities, the difficulty is greatly lessened and often conquered by seeing what possible choices there are. Pupils who really know the individual facts often fail to identify form and construction because they cannot visualize or image at one

moment the things that must be compared. Such a comprehensive grasp would mean mastery of the subject. It tests even the expert. Immature pupils should be definitely trained in the art of imaging by every possible means. In this field Graphic Latin will prove useful.

One sheet deals with nouns, paradigms and rules of usage, with examples illustrating the rules; another sheet deals with adjectives, their declension and comparison, and with adverbs, their derivation and comparison; a third with verbs, their conjugation and rules of usage, illustrated by examples; the fourth with pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections. By way of detail it may be noted that the sheet dealing with verbs has on the left-hand side a complete synopsis of the verb, in the first person for the indicative and the subjunctive, in the second person for the imperative, and in the nominative for the participles. A heavy black line is drawn about the paradigms, e. g. of the subjunctive, and is carried over to the right-hand margin of the sheet, to surround the rules for the syntax of the mood, with the examples of the rules. So, on the sheet dealing with nouns, each case, with the rules for its usage, is blocked off by itself by this heavy blank line. Much useful information is given in footnotes.

As compared with the blackboard these sheets save time, secure uniformity, and are portable. They are not a substitute for a First Year Latin Book, but they may well be used from the beginning as a growing summary. The sentences illustrating noun and verb syntax are simple, whereas those of the professional Grammar are often so hard and so long that they are not even attempted by the ordinary pupil. No proof of intelligence about a construction is better than a simple working model of it. The best way to use this method is for each student to make his own samples, being helped at first by the teacher and the charts. For the sake of making parrot-like memory impossible, it is better not to encourage the use of one fixed illustration.

But Graphic Latin does not arrange the syntax as the problems present themselves in actual study. And it does not claim to give enough help to avoid the necessity of other printed books and charts with the same general object. The value of the book is much limited by this fact. Mr. Green suggests that teachers may supplement the illustrations, but, in saving time for teachers and pupils, why not save more? Memory associations are more or less disturbed by changing and enlarging the tables. Better have them adequate from the beginning, and then select. In composition work especially, questions of syntax present themselves as topics and associated ideas, where distinctions must be made. To these distinctions pupils need clues put in tabloid form. They need small memory tables and guides which shall be used continuously through the course, though texts and composition books are changed. Many valuable memory associations are lost in changing from book to book.

The author has made no attempt to improve upon the old paradigm method of learning forms. The recitation of paradigms is largely wasted time. It is one more dull, monotonous thing that can be eliminated in the effort to make the Latin class alive. The rapid mental arithmetic style of synthesis and analysis of single forms is the actual problem. The glib recitation of models, *porta, portae, portae, amo, amas, amat*, is very deceptive, often wrong in pronunciation (accent), and may not be accompanied by skill in application. The quick use of a condensed table of formations is the object desired. Verb-forms should be detected and made up by significant parts, stem, auxiliary, syllables, and endings. Graphic Latin gives the first form in all tenses of all conjugations, with the endings in heavy type, and it gives no clue to other forms and makes no attempt to show how they are to be made—a serious lack. As I was using the book recently with a pupil who was trying in vain to locate a deponent verb-form he commented, "If I learn it like that, as soon as I see a different verb I am twisted". Students have not time to go back and say over paradigms, hoping to hear themselves saying by good luck the form desired.

The laborious study of verbs as four different conjugations is largely unnecessary. The method of formation is practically the same in all. One ordinary page will show how to make all regular forms—and without the necessity of translating everything into terms of *amo, moneo*, etc. Thus, it is easy to make it clear that the perfect systems, active and passive, imperatives, infinitives, participles, verbal nouns and adjectives, imperfect indicatives and subjunctives are made alike in all. Futures are of two types. All conjugations use *a* for the present subjunctive, except that the first happens to have it in the stem. The present indicatives are easily shown to have the same method of formation. Pupils quickly understand how the short vowels adjust themselves to the endings in the third and fourth conjugations. The forms and meanings of the perfect system one may clearly distinguish by thinking of the auxiliary parts as so many forms of *sum*. The past subjunctive of *sum* and the perfect active stem naturally make the past perfect subjunctive active: whether the endings of this tense were or were not in actual fact derived from the imperfect subjunctive of *sum*, as some maintain (e. g. Allen and Greenough, 169, e), the Roman may well have thought of *essem* as he used the pluperfect subjunctive active (Bennett, *The Latin Language*, 222.4). The present subjunctive of *sum* and the perfect passive stem make the present perfect subjunctive passive. Such a system goes far toward remembering itself. It certainly goes far toward correcting a wrong memory.

So far as the physical features of the book are concerned, it may be said that there are advantages in the big page, lying flat on a desk; but there *must* be a desk and the big pages must be frequently turned. The folded size does not fit in with the pack of books that a student will be carrying. In order to carry out the plan

of a few large pages, too many slightly-related things have been assembled upon one page. This may make a good panorama but it does not favor the clear grasp of one unit topic. There is too much landscape for a clear memory-photograph. In brief, then, the book is a valuable aid to pupil and teacher; but it would be more valuable if it were more complete and more truly graphic.

THE HAVERFORD SCHOOL.

FRANKLIN A. DAKIN.

Modern Greek in Asia Minor. A Study of the Dialects of Silli, Cappadocia and Phárasa with Grammar, Texts, Translations and Glossary. By R. M. Dawkins. With a Chapter on the Subject-matter of the Folk-tales, by W. R. Halliday. Cambridge: at the University Press (1916). Pp. xiv + 695. 9 illustrations and 2 maps. \$9.50.

Most of the works which have appeared in recent years in the field of Modern Greek dialectology have been devoted to Greece and the islands, but the precarious condition of the Greek dialects of Asia Minor, threatened by the crushing advance of Turkish, by the danger of absorption into the common Greek, by the increasing emigration, and by persecutions which have become even more bitter since the outbreak of the present war, has made it necessary to study this neglected modern Greek in order to preserve a record of the Greek language as it developed in an isolated area separated from the rest of the Greek-speaking world. This pressing need has been met by the admirable, though expensive, book of Mr. Dawkins, who was formerly Director of the British School at Athens and had travelled extensively in Asia Minor. Mr. Dawkins shows that he is a highly trained philologist and takes his place at once with Hatzidakis and Thumb as one of the greatest authorities in the field of Modern Greek philology. His book is full of detail and erudite, but accurate, original, and sane, one of the most important books in Greek philology. It will appeal not only to philologists and grammarians but to students of folklore and social history, for after the introductory and grammatical chapters, the latter taking up nearly two hundred pages, there follows a chapter by Professor Halliday on the subject-matter of the folk-tales which Mr. Dawkins himself had recorded in his travels. Three quarters of these most interesting dialect folk-tales are printed with the Greek text on one page and an English translation on the opposite page (284-579). An important glossary for the dialects and for the Turkish words and a good index and two maps complete the book, which is illustrated with many good photographs taken by the author himself. The bibliographies are extremely full. I miss only J. C. Lawson's *Modern Greek Folk-lore and Ancient Greek Religion*, but perhaps the omission is intentional, since we are told (217) that it cannot be too strongly insisted that there is no special connexion between ancient mythology and modern Greek folk-tales. Certainly it does seem that

there are almost no such survivals in Asia Minor as the Callicantzari or centaurs in Greece; but it will be difficult for the classical student of survivals to believe that the Phárasa story (551) has no connexion with the story in the *Odyssey*, even though there may be some 211 variants, all perhaps going back to a pre-Homeric folk-tale.

The Cyclops ran up; he seized the seven priests. He carried them to his house. In the evening he roasted one priest; he ate him. He was fat. He ate him; he got drunk. The six priests rose up. They heated the spit. They drove it into the Cyclops' eye. They blinded the Cyclops. They ran away. Inside the stable the Cyclops had seven hundred sheep. They went into the stable. They flayed six sheep. They left their heads and their tails. They got into the skins. In the morning the Cyclops rose up; he drove out the sheep; he took them by the head and tail. He drove out the seven hundred sheep. He shut the doors. He went inside; he searched for the six priests. He could not find them. He found the six sheep killed.

The story told in the dream (359) reminds me somewhat of the Danaë story. Here again there is probably no survival of the Greek myth, but both go back to a common type of folk-tale.

And the woman said, "Let us fetch a chest; let us put the boy into it, and throw it into the sea". They put him into the chest; they threw him into the sea. Afterwards floating and floating he came to the edge of the sea. Afterwards a female servant saw him there, and went and told her master. Her master said, "If it be a man", said he, "it shall be mine; if it be a thing", said he, "let it be yours", said he. They opened it. They saw a little boy, who is floating in it. Her master took the boy and made him his child.

The other stories are fairly representative of the main types of Greek folk-lore. For example there are three versions (363, 447, 515) of the story of The Forty Thieves which most know from the Arabian Nights and which is very popular in Greece; but the tales of a Cinderella, a Beauty and the Beast, a Striglla, and a Skandalos are lacking.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. DAVID M. ROBINSON.

A MINIATURE DRAMA: AENEID 1. 338-368

A miniature drama is found in a familiar passage, Aeneid 1.338-368, where Venus points out to Aeneas, her son, the ill-fortune of Queen Dido, which compelled her to leave her native land in search of a new kingdom in Africa. The dramatic personae are Dido, Sychaeus, and Pygmalion. The scene is laid in ancient Tyre, the Mediterranean, and Carthage in the days of its founding.

In this tragedy of Sychaeus we have a Prologue (338-342), Five Acts (343-359), an Epilogue (360-368); a rising and a descending action, culminating in the climax of the Fourth Act; a plot or *dolus*, involving the murder; and a *dénouement*, indicating Dido's way of escape from her impending misfortunes.

These thirty lines present, at least in bold outline, a drama of perfect form and content. Love is the main-spring of the dramatic action, with greed and jealousy as conflicting elements, and, though thwarted, love is

still triumphant, following the queen even after the death of her murdered husband. The love of money leads to this terrible crime, but the love of Sychaeus for his wife overcomes all difficulties and finally reunites them in the lower world. The drama moves on to a grand consummation in the triumph of right over wrong.

The Prologue (338-342) tells us about the Punic realm, the Tyrian nation, Agenor's town, the Libyans, and Queen Dido.

The First Act (343-346) informs us that Sychaeus is Dido's husband, 'wealthiest of Phoenician land-owners', and the Second Act (346-347) that Pygmalion is Dido's brother, 'in crime monstrous beyond the rest of men'. The Third Act, in one brief sentence (348), informs us of the feud which arises between the two; the Fourth (348-352) describes the murder of Sychaeus and its concealment. The Fifth (353-359) portrays the appearance of Sychaeus's ghost, unveiling 'the dark domestic crime' and unsealing 'a hoard of treasure hid in the earth'.

The Epilogue (360-368) sets forth the events subsequent to the conversation between Dido and the ghost, the preparation for flight, the seizure of the treasure, the sailing of the ships, the landing in Carthage, and the purchase of land for a new city.

The five acts are sketched in the space of about one hundred words, and the whole drama, including the Prologue and the Epilogue, in less than two hundred words¹.

WESTERN MARYLAND COLLEGE.

H. OSBORNE RYDER.

LAUDES HIEMIS

Palinodia in Horati Carmen 1.4

*Irruit acris hiems dura vice frigoris nivosi,
pratisque flores eripit gelatis;
nunc stabulis placidum gaudet pecus et viator igni,
portusque navim liberat procellis.*

*Nec pila¹ iam pueris placet incita, nec libet dolosos
hamos parare piscibus tenellis;
flumina nec nantur nimis algida, membra nec calore
defessa quaerunt arbores opacas.*

*At iuvenes properant rapido pede rura pervagari,
densasque silvas aut agros apertos;
fortius ut reboat colles prope cantilena laeta,
aves sonoras quis dolet silere?*

*Mox, cum bruma tenax glacie premet impetus aquarum,
nec vis procellae nec calor focorum
impediet pueros, prenis cito ferreis² carinis,
temptare cursu rivulos gelatos.*

*Luminibus nivis ut campus nitet, arboresque fulgent
gemmae coruscae milibus, refractis
solis per radios, grata prece concinamus orbis
Patrem benignum temporumque³ Regem!*

ST. STANISLAUS SEMINARY,
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A. F. GEYSER, S. J.

¹With Professor Ryder's paper may be compared an editorial in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8, 169-170, on The Aeneid as a Tragedy.

C. K.

¹*pila incita*, 'foot-ball'.
²*ferreus*, 'seasons'.

³*ferreus carinae*, 'skates'.

Some time ago a Professor of Latin in a Western College wrote to me as follows:

"Nearly all discussions of the value of Latin have been from the view point of High School Latin. May we not have a discussion of the value of College Latin?"

The writer went on to say that students who have had four years, or even only two years, of Latin in the High School think that they have had Latin enough and that only prospective teachers of Latin will or should elect Latin in College.

In a somewhat extended search in various periodicals recently, not merely periodicals primarily devoted to classical interests, but to others, I have found little bearing on the subject suggested by the correspondent in question. In Educational Review 43 (1912), 236-249, Professor R. D. Stuart, of Princeton University, published an article entitled Latin in the College Course. This article deals to some extent with the theme the correspondent had in mind—what College Latin ought to do for a young man or woman.

I shall be obliged to any reader of this note who will send me the title of any other article bearing on this subject. In the meantime, it may not be amiss to conclude with a reference to Dean Gildersleeve's article, The Purpose of College Greek, published in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10, 114-117.

C. K.

LAUDES HIEMIS¹

No longer over fields and plains are Autumn's flowers blown,

For Winter with his icy breath has come into his own;
Now barnyards, ports and jolly inns become the nonce again

The winter refuge of the herds and merchant craft and men.

Now football, king of autumn sports, has lost his power to thrill,

While rainbow trout glide undisturbed through brook-
let, lake and rill;

Now too the lure of shady nooks has spent its magic spell,

And once inviting waters now the whistling youth repel.

But arm in arm with springy step the young men sally forth

To tramp the rural roads and fields from southwards to the north;

When nearby hills reecho with the music of their glee,
What honest critic misses then the warbler's minstrelry?

When brusque King Winter next in turn has roofed the streams with ice,

No more will cozy fire-place the stripling youth entice;
He whets his skates and pushes forth disdainful of the wind,

With rhythmic strokes to race along and leave the miles behind.

While all the earth reflects the gleam of newly fallen snow,

And frosted trees bedecked with gems a fairy starlight throw,

Come let us praise with grateful hearts the Master, so benign,

Who from the clouds directs the world with Providence Divine!

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JOSEPH P. MELCHORS, S. J.

¹A translation of Father Geyser's *Laudes Hiemis*.